

# Mobility Day 2019

**Tim Cappalli | Identity Architect @ Aruba**


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# New Technologies


## WPA3 and Enhanced Open


← Add network

Network name

Enter the SSID 

Security

None 

Enhanced Open 

WEP

WPA/WPA2-Personal

WPA3-Personal

WPA/WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise

WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit

# WPA3-Personal (SAE)

## THE TECH

Based off a  
Dragonfly key exchange

Zero knowledge proof

## WHAT IT MEANS

"Weak" passwords are  
less prone to to attack

One passphrase  
guess per attack

## UX IMPACT

None!

# WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode (CNNSA)

## THE TECH

192-bit encryption (Suite B)

TLS 1.2+

Restricted cipher suites

TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384  
TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384  
TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384

## WHAT IT MEANS

EAP-TLS Only

Higher security

Not backwards compatible

EAP server certificate changes  
(3072-bit+ | P-384)

## UX IMPACT

Not something an average  
end-user would need to  
configure

# Enhanced Open

## THE TECH

Uses OWE  
(Opportunistic Wireless Encryption)

Diffie-Hellman  
Key Exchange

## WHAT IT MEANS

Datapath encryption  
by default!

Backwards compatible  
with legacy open

## UX IMPACT

Very little


Potential  
new indicators

# WPA3

OS / Supplicant	Personal	Personal with Password ID	Enterprise	Enterprise 192-bit Mode (CNSA)	Enhanced Open (OWE)
<b>Windows 10</b>	1903*				
<b>Android</b>	Q (10)*		Q (10)	Q (10)	Q (10)*
<b>macOS</b>	10.15				
<b>iOS</b>	13				
<b>wpa_supplicant</b>	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7

# iOS and macOS

# Profile Installation Changes in iOS





# Certificate Requirements (macOS 10.15)

## GENERAL

2048-bit or greater private key

SHA-256+ hash

Max 825 Days (leaf)

## EAP SERVER CERTIFICATE

SAN must be present

Non-EV  
(DV or OV)

# Windows 10

# MAC Randomization in Windows 10




## GLOBAL

Probe MAC randomized

MAC generated per saved ESSID

Hash(MAC, secret, ESSID, connection ID)




## PER-ESSID

A. Use hardware MAC address

B. Use fixed random MAC address

C. Rotate MAC address daily



\*\*\* BOTH REQUIRE HARDWARE (AND DRIVER) SUPPORT \*\*\*

# Android


# EAP Server Certificate Validation

EAP server identity validation must now be configured

CA certificate  
Use system certificates ▼


Domain  
\_\_\_\_\_

Must specify a domain.



# MAC Randomization in Android

Android  
Q



Enabled by default

Generated when the SSID is  
Saved to the network list


Persistent for OS instance  
lifetime

Manual control available

# Passpoint

## Hotspot 2.0

# How does it work?





OS	R2					R3
	R1	OSU	EAP-TLS	EAP-TTLS	Remediation	
Windows 10						
Android		Q (10)	Q (10)	Q (10)	Q (10)	
macOS	*					
iOS	*					
wpa_supplicant						

# Current Challenges

- Android EAP server trust
- iOS network selection behavior
- Apple's proprietary configuration format
- Windows 10 provisioning
- Privacy

# RADIUS/TLS

## RadSec

# RadSec Flavors

- RADIUS over TLS
  - Also referred to as RADIUS/TLS
  - TCP 2083
  
- RADIUS over DTLS
  - Also referred to as RADIUS/DTLS
  - UDP 2083

# "EAP Stack" for RADIUS/TLS

EAP


RADIUS

TLS

TCP

IP

# RADIUS/TLS



# Why is RADIUS/TLS so important?

## PERFORMANCE

Congestion control

No duplicate requests

Persistent session

No UDP fragmentation issues

## SECURITY

(next few slides)

# Why is RADIUS/TLS so important?

[\[Docs\]](#) [\[txt|pdf\]](#) [\[draft-ietf-nasr...\]](#) [\[Tracker\]](#) [\[Diff1\]](#) [\[Diff2\]](#)

Obsoleted by: [2138](#)

PROPOSED STANDARD

Network Working Group  
Request for Comments: 2058  
Category: Standards Track

C. Rigney  
Livingston  
A. Rubens  
Merit  
W. Simpson  
Daydreamer  
S. Willens  
Livingston  
January 1997

## Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)

### Status of this Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

### Abstract

This document describes a protocol for carrying authentication, authorization, and configuration information between a Network Access Server which desires to authenticate its links and a shared Authentication Server.

### Table of Contents



# Why is RADIUS/TLS so important?

```
▶ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1812, Dst Port: 36918
▼ RADIUS Protocol
  Code: Access-Accept (2)
  Packet identifier: 0x93 (147)
  Length: 250
  Authenticator: 72d6262108a87b241a242183b19eccd4
  \[This is a response to a request in frame 20744\]
  [Time from request: 0.033581000 seconds]
  Attribute Value Pairs
    ▼ AVP: t=Vendor-Specific(26) l=58 vnd=Microsoft(311)
      Type: 26
      Length: 58
      Vendor ID: Microsoft (311)
      ▶ VSA: t=MS-MPPE-Recv-Key(17) l=52 val=c8e90f13fdf59aee1ab1b16f1dc1cc5a9057e922ce473ffa...
    ▼ AVP: t=Vendor-Specific(26) l=58 vnd=Microsoft(311)
      Type: 26
      Length: 58
      Vendor ID: Microsoft (311)
      ▶ VSA: t=MS-MPPE-Send-Key(16) l=52 val=d1b65014ea21cddb4155c84ec425b12471e6ac33318da373...
    ▶ AVP: t=EAP-Message(79) l=6 Last Segment[1]
    ▶ AVP: t=Message-Authenticator(80) l=18 val=e4915b66043edc0495e0c13f9e73efd2
    ▶ AVP: t=User-Name(1) l=10 val=mlavelle
    ▶ AVP: t=Vendor-Specific(26) l=22 vnd=Aruba Networks Inc(14823)
    ▼ AVP: t=Class(25) l=58 val=e885ee10bf3a420b9cd2e4706a53ea88100c000000000000...
      Type: 25
```

# Why is RADIUS/TLS so important?

[TIME RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST IS IN FRAME 40/01](#)

## ▼ Attribute Value Pairs

- ▼ AVP: t=User-Name(1) l=35 val=asa-sensor.device.arubaboston.com
  - Type: 1
  - Length: 35
  - User-Name: asa-sensor.device.arubaboston.com
- ▶ AVP: t=NAS-IP-Address(4) l=6 val=100.66.1.101
- ▶ AVP: t=NAS-Port(5) l=6 val=0
- ▶ AVP: t=NAS-Identifier(32) l=12 val=B0S-7010-A
- ▶ AVP: t=NAS-Port-Type(61) l=6 val=Wireless-802.11(19)
- ▼ AVP: t=Calling-Station-Id(31) l=19 val=20-4C-03-31-20-8D
  - Type: 31
  - Length: 19
  - Calling-Station-Id: 20-4C-03-31-20-8D
- ▶ AVP: t=Called-Station-Id(30) l=29 val=00-0B-86-9A-E3-D7:cappyroam
- ▶ AVP: t=Service-Type(6) l=6 val=Framed(2)
- ▶ AVP: t=Framed-MTU(12) l=6 val=1100
- ▶ AVP: t=EAP-Message(79) l=40 Last Segment[1]
- ▼ AVP: t=Vendor-Specific(26) l=17 vnd=Aruba Networks Inc(14823)
  - Type: 26
  - Length: 17
  - Vendor ID: Aruba Networks Inc (14823)
  - ▶ VSA: t=Aruba-Essid-Name(5) l=11 val=cappyroam
- ▼ AVP: t=Vendor-Specific(26) l=18 vnd=Aruba Networks Inc(14823)
  - Type: 26
  - Length: 18
  - Vendor ID: Aruba Networks Inc (14823)
  - ▶ VSA: t=Aruba-Location-Id(6) l=12 val=B0S-335-LR
- ▼ AVP: t=Vendor-Specific(26) l=16 vnd=Aruba Networks Inc(14823)
  - Type: 26
  - Length: 16
  - Vendor ID: Aruba Networks Inc (14823)
  - ▶ VSA: t=Aruba-AP-Group(10) l=10 val=B0S-Main
- ▶ AVP: t=Acct-Session-Id(44) l=29 val=204C0331208D-5C62D97D-1DC0E
- ▶ AVP: t=Message-Authenticator(80) l=18 val=4d8e048d0be85c23e68aec35a46eb96d

# RADIUS/TLS Support



HiveManager\*

Access Points



Access Points



Mobility Controllers

Instant APs

Switches

ClearPass (6.8)



Catalyst 9300  
(as of 16.10)



FreeRADIUS (v3) | Packetfence

# Thanks!

Questions?