In a federated AAI, the user’s Home Organisation issuing and managing user’s credentials determines the assurance level available for the user identity. For the risk management of the research services relying on the federated AAI, it is important to determine the assurance profile available for the authenticated users. What the relevant assurance profile is obviously very much depends on the risk associated with offering the service, the availability of resource to provide identity and attribute assurance, and a mechanism to convey defined assurance information. Whilst most of these elements are beyond the direct control of AARC, the baseline and differentiates assurance profiles developed through AARC - in close collaboration with the user communites, research and e-infrastructures, and with consultation from federation and IdP operators via the GEANT4 project - help establish common ground by which to exchange policy information

Deliverable DNA3.1:
Differentiated LoA recommendations for policy and practices of identity and attribute providers, applicable to research use cases

The consolidated and formatted version of DNA3.1 (due M23) is now available:

Under development

The REFEDS assurance framework discussed the components of assurance (for IdPs) and how to group these together in ways that make sense to (groups of) SPs:

Public Consulations (Completed)

Working papers

Meetings