Are there already one or more national recognised digital (identity) wallets being used in this country ( e.g. EUDI wallet, wallets that are used in different sectors etc.)? Where can we find information about them?

Does the nation have an idea and maybe even a documented architecture for how the national identity wallet(s) and/or the EU digital identity wallet should be build and how the wallet ecosystem should be integrated with the rest of the digitalised society?

Which actors within the nation are actively involved in the work of the digital identity wallets, e.

g. organisations working on the ecosystem components or organisations that have the responsibility to uphold certain functions of the eIDAS regulation.

France has not yet introduced a national digital identity wallet but plans to adopt the EUDI Wallet. France has introduced the France Identité app, a government-developed digital identity application designed to simplify interactions with administrative services and enhance secure identity verification. Launched on February 14, 2024, this free application allows users to store their national ID card information on their smartphones, facilitating various procedures more efficiently. [ref]

FranceConnect is a single sign-on platform provided by the French government. It allows users to securely log in to over 1,400 online services (both public and private) using a single set of credentials. This eliminates the need to create multiple accounts for different services. An enhanced version of FranceConnect, called FranceConnect+, is used for more sensitive services, such as those involving financial transactions or highly secure data. It requires stronger identity verification, often through a digital identity like France Identité.

FranceConnect: France is working to integrate its existing national digital identity systems, such as the FranceConnect platform, into the EUDI Wallet framework. FranceConnect is already a widely used digital identity system that allows citizens to access various public services securely.

France, in collaboration with Germany, leads the POTENTIAL consortium, which began work on the EUDI Wallet, with deployment expected by 2025. [ref]

France collaborates with private companies and technology providers to develop and refine the EUDI Wallet. For example:

• IDEMIA, a French multinational specializing in identity technologies, is contributing to the wallet's infrastructure. IDEMIA focuses on secure identity verification, biometric authentication, and pseudonymization to protect user data. [ref]
• iDAKTO, a company enabling secure and sovereign interactions with personal data, is also involved in ensuring the wallet's security and compliance with privacy regulations. [ref]

Germany has not yet introduced a national digital identity wallet but plans to adopt the EUDI Wallet. The current usable national identity app in Germany is the AusweisApp2. This app allows users to utilize their electronic identity card (eID) for secure online identification. With AusweisApp2, individuals can prove their identity digitally, enabling them to complete various tasks online, such as submitting applications that would typically require in-person verification and signatures. [ref]

Data included in the national electronic ID card: photograph, the data the person can see on his/her ID card (Surname, Name at birth, given names, date of birth, place of birth, date of expiry, card access number, signature, colour of eyes, address, height, date, authority, religious name or pseudonym, logo eID function) and, if the person wishes, also his/her fingerprints. The person decides whether his/her fingerprint data will be stored on the ID card.ref
 

Blueprint for the EUDI Wallet Ecosystem in Germany: Wallet function PID issuance and presentation [ref] 

Update flows - PID (2025 April 4th) [ref]

You will find many info about Digital Identity Readiness in this [ref]

Architektur- & Konsultationsprozess für EUDI-Wallets in Deutschland [ref]

The German Federal Agency for Disruptive Innovation (SPRIND) has announced the first six participants of its competition to design EUDI Wallet prototypes.

The winning projects which got funded are:

• Sphereon Wallet for All from Netherlands-based digital credentials company Sphereon
• Heidi: Humanzentrierte EID Infrastruktur under Zurich firm Ubique Innovation
• Animo Easy-PID from Utrecht-based Animo Solutions
• eID client Wallet-Evolution from German company Governikus
• TICE Wallet from Berlin-based startup Tice 
• eEWA – easy EUDI-Wallet App made by another German firm called Authada. [ref]

SPRIND, has come out with five new names that will test their prototypes within the non-funding track. Projects that will participate in creating the EUDI Wallet without financial assistance from SPRIND are:

• Google’s Android German EUDI Open Source Wallet Prototype
• Samsung’s solution for EUDI Wallets
• IdealWALLET from German software company Kaprion
• ID-Wallet from Lissi, the innovation unit of banking institution Commerzbank AG
• wwWallet from a group of creators including Sunet (Swedish University Computer Network), GUnet (Greek Universities Network) and Swedish hardware authentication device maker Yubico. [ref]

User Research

Insights overview:

1. Comfort and efficiency outweight concerns
2. The EUDI Wallet offers simple value to the less digital savvy
3. Longer set-up for the EUDI Wallet creates the perception of better long-term efficiency and security
4. Digital must be simpler than analogue alternatives
5. People feel powerless against data thefths and security breaches
6. End-users expect transparent continuous developments
7. For many, the real issue is the hassle of recovering from identity thefth and loss, not the thefth itself
8. Past experiences deeply shape mistrust. Without negative experiences, end-users behave naively
9. There are individually different assessments of which data makeup your personal identity and how it should be protected

In development

https://www.nldigitalgovernment.nl/overview/identity/id-wallet/

https://www.nldigitalgovernment.nl/news/advancements-in-the-dutch-id-wallet/

Wallet in Figma

Wallet App

Wallet Web

Some municipalities have entered into agreements with wallet providers and are offering wallet-based solutions for certain credentials to their employees or residents. However, there is as far as we know currently no national wallet initiative outside the EUDI Wallet effort led by the government.

The Agency for Digital Government (Digg) has been designated as the EUDI Wallet provider and is also responsible for establishing the national certification scheme. The directory of relying parties will be maintained by the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS), and some other roles within the national ecosystem have also been assigned.

Digg has initiated the development of a national EUDI Wallet. The aim is to support an open model where private companies may apply to certify their wallets under the Swedish eID scheme. The government-issued wallet will focus on accessibility, inclusiveness, and high security.

Digg is actively participating in the Large Scale Pilots (LSPs) EWC and DC4EU, and will also take part in WE BUILD.

The Swedish Companies Registration Office (Bolagsverket) has been assigned responsibility for providing PID for legal persons. However, the entity responsible for issuing PID for natural persons has not yet been officially designated.

In pilot implementations, a successful authentication at LoA High will trigger a lookup in the Swedish population registry to retrieve PID attributes for natural persons, which are then packaged and issued to the wallet.

Within the LSPs, Digg is issuing PID using SD-JWT and mdoc formats for testing purposes. Sweden is actively seeking cross-border testing opportunities to ensure interoperability of PID issuance and consumption between wallets.

Architecture documents and technical references are not yet publicly available. Work is ongoing to map how the EUDI Wallet can be effectively integrated into Sweden’s existing digital infrastructure. This includes proposals for shared services for attestation issuance, acceptance of the wallet both as an eID and as a credential presentation tool, as well as communication strategies to ensure that public sector stakeholders are informed and prepared.

There are multiple Swedish participants in the LSPs (EWC, DC4EU, and WE BUILD), representing both public and private sector actors. National stakeholder coordination is still in early stages but expected to increase.

Sweden has private eID providers that currently dominate the market, operating at LoA Substantial. Work is ongoing to develop a government-issued eID that meets the LoA High requirements under eIDAS.

Swiyu (testing) wallet (in Android and Apple store). 
Public git repo: https://github.com/e-id-admin/eidch-public-beta

DIDAS is a cross-sectorial industry group of SSI advocates that is acting as an expert voice.

A minimal set with all required components is out as "public beta": Swiyu wallet, issuer and verifier components and a proprietary trust framework.
For most aspects, compatibility with the ARF/EUDI wallet is considered crucial.
The production variants are scheduled for some time in 2026 (two groups are currently trying to force a referendum by collecting 50k signatures by mid-April. If it passes this might add delays)
Public git repo: https://github.com/e-id-admin/eidch-public-beta

The BGEID (the Swiss E-ID law) passed the parliament in December 2024. More than 50k citicens signed a call for referendum requiring a popular vote on the law. This vote took place on 28 September 2025 and the law passed with a marginal majority. The Swiss E-ID will be implemented as planned with a delivery date in 2026/27.

GOV.UK Wallet 

The UK government has developed its own digital identity framework for the implementation of the GOV.UK Wallet:

• UK Digital Identity and Attributes Trust Framework (DIATF), which provides guidelines for digital identity verification.
• GOV.UK One Login is the UK's new unified digital identity system for storing exclusively government-issued documents and accessing public services. There is a limited number of public services accessible wit GOV.UK One Login

The UK is not contributing to the EUDI Wallet due to its non-EU status. 

• The UK is collaborating with international digital identity initiatives, but not specifically with the EUDI Wallet.

• Influenced by the EUDIW (eIDAS 2.0) standards.
• Consists of users' name, date of birth, nationality or residency status, and a verified photograph.
• Verification: To generate this data, users must first verify their identity using the GOV.UK One Login app (which may involve a face scan) or at a Post Office.
• PID is stored locally on the users' device—not in a centralized government database—.
• The system is designed for selective disclosure

Gov.uk wallet technical documentation

Already launched (>18 million downloads. Currently supports digital ID card, and mDL)

https://info.mobywatel.gov.pl/en

mObywatel 3.0: Poland is currently developing the next generation of its app (mObywatel 3.0), which will be fully eIDAS 2.0 compliant. To ensure a smooth transition, the current version (2.0) and the future EUDIW-compliant version (3.0) are being tested and developed in parallel.

Core PID attributes in mObywatel:

•     First name(s)
•     Surname
•     Date of birth
•     PESEL number (Polish identification number)
•     Nationality
•     Photo (Image)
•     Document status
•     Document number
•     Serial number
•     Date of issue and period of validity

Technical data (PID metadata)

•     Certificate issue date
•     Certificate expiry date
•     Issuing authority
•     Dynamic data: The emblem-shaped hologram changes colour to confirm authenticity in real time.

mObywatel Mobile

Poland is an active participant in the POTENTIAL consortium, one of the major EU pilot projects for the EUDI wallet, which is testing functionalities such as e-government services, bank account opening, SIM registration and mobile driving licences.

StudentID

The Student ID Card in the mObywatel app can be used by persons with the status of a student, who study at universities, which have signed relevant agreements with the Ministry of Digital Affairs.

These are students under 26 years of age, who are currently on:

• 1st degree (undergraduate) studies
• 2nd degree (Master’s) studies
• uniform master’s degree studies.

It is worth noting that postgraduate and doctoral studies do not entitle you to the student’s status.

mLegitymacja is the digital version of StudentID

Italy released the “Documenti su IO” functionality as the first step towards the Italian Digital Wallet, introducing in a production stage the first pre-release of “IT-Wallet System”. On 4 December 2024 the national digital services mobile app (IO App) enabled all citizens and residents to activate and store the digital version of three documents: the digital Driving License, Health Insurance Card and Disability Card.

Italy is currently working on aligning its digital identity framework with eIDAS regulations to ensure interoperability with EUDIW implementations, towards the integration of its national digital identity system into the EUDI Wallet ecosystem.
Italy actively contributes to two of the European Commission’s EUDIW Large Scale Pilot Projects, the NOBID and POTENTIAL consortiums, and in the upcoming APTITUDE and WEBUILD consortiums.

Two main eID systems: SPID (33M users, 675M logins in late 2022) and CIE (30.6M cards)
National strategy (“Italia 2026”) aims for 70% adult uptake by 2026  ref

https://developer.pagopa.it/

https://github.com/italia/eid-wallet-it-docs

Key stakeholders involved in Italy’s digital identity efforts include:

• Department for Digital Transformation of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers as owner institution
• PagoPA S.p.A. as IO app owner and public IT-Wallet provider
• Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato (IPZS - the Italian State Printing Works and Mint) as digital documents issuer.

• Updated uptake numbers of the “Documenti su IO” functionality can be found on the IO App official website.
• Ongoing efforts to incorporate digital identity functionality by 2025.

Launched 2024 May (Currently holds official documents and allows access to public services. mDL is coming 2025, EHIC is coming in 2026)

https://mygov.be/

MyGov.be is a state-owned, government-run national digital wallet launched by the Belgian Federal Government.
It serves as an official digital identification and document wallet, acting as a public-sector alternative (or complement) to the private Itsme platform. ref

• MyGov.be is being positioned as Belgium’s implementation of the European Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI Wallet) under the eIDAS 2.0 regulation.

• Government sources (BOSA) indicate that MyGov will support the requirements of the EU digital identity framework and will be expanded with features such as a mobile eID, qualified electronic signature, and verifiable credentials.

• In short: Belgium is aligning MyGov.be with the upcoming EUDI Wallet standard.

• MyGov.be uses existing national identity data sources (eID, population registry, government databases).

• The app does not create a new central data repository; it retrieves authoritative data from existing government systems.

• Users can access official personal documents (e.g., birth certificates, driving license, certificates).

• Authentication is done through secure methods (PIN, QR code login, eID card, or via Itsme).

• Planned features include a fully digital mobile eID and qualified digital signatures.

• The article does not provide a public technical architecture document.

• What is known:

  • MyGov.be relies on Belgium’s Federal Authentication Service (FAS).

  • It reuses existing government identity sources rather than building new databases.

  • The detailed technical architecture (protocols, APIs, trust frameworks) is handled by BOSA but not fully published in the referenced article.
    If needed, these documents may exist internally or in government technical publications.

Key stakeholder groups involved in or affected by MyGov.be include:

Government

• Belgian Federal Government

• BOSA (Federal Public Service Policy & Support)

• Local and regional government administrations

Citizens

• Belgian residents using digital public services

• Early testers and pilot users

Public service providers

• Government departments issuing certificates, identity data, or public services (tax, pension, social security, eBox, etc.)

Private-sector stakeholders

• Itsme (private ID provider previously relied upon heavily)

• Banks and telecom operators originally involved in Itsme

Technical & security partners

• Cybersecurity experts

• Technical integrators and eID infrastructure providers

European Union

• EU institutions supervising EUDI Wallet alignment under eIDAS 2.0

Launched 2022 (Currently supports digital ID, mDL and more. Developed by private player Youniqx)

https://www.oesterreich.gv.at/en/eausweise.html

Based on building on two established apps: eID Austria, a mobile digital ID app geared toward online use cases and 

eAusweise, a mobile app for driving licenses geared toward in-person use cases, which already has approximately 1 million users ref.

Migration preparation for the two apps into the EUDI wallet architecture: open-source wallet named Valera (used for testing and implementation in the Large-Scale Pilots.

Developed by the Austrian Secure Information Technology Center (A-SIT)).

https://a-sit-plus.github.io/

GRNET is actively following the development of the EUDIW and working on the evolution of the existing gov.gr wallet to an EUDIW compliant wallet (ensuring ARF compliance). To this end, GRNET is a partner to EUDIW-related Large Scale Pilots like POTENTIAL, EWC, DC4EU and the forthcoming APTITUDE and WE BUILD projects. 

The PID currently included in the gov.gr wallet is from the national ID card and it contains:

• ID Number
• Issuance Date
• Name
• Surname
• Father's Name
• Mother's Name
• Date of Birth
• Place of Birth
• Issuance Office
• ID Photo

The gov.gr wallet also includes other documents, such as driving licences, vehicle licenses, as well as social security certificates.

Malta is preparing a digital identity wallet that lets citizens use a free smartphone app in place of their physical ID or passport. Developed by the Malta Digital Innovation Authority, the wallet will meet EU EUDI requirements by December 2026, enabling secure identity and age verification with privacy safeguards. Future updates could add credentials like driver’s licenses, transit cards, and boarding passes ref

Spain has launched MiDNI, a new mobile digital ID app intended to replace (or at least complement) the physical national ID (DNI). The app provides a secure, signed QR code, usable for everyday tasks such as checking into hotels, opening bank accounts, and signing papers. The physical card is still valid during a transition period, giving organizations 12 months to adapt.

Looking ahead to 2026, Spain plans to add digital signatures and remote ID verification to MiDNI, enabling more online administrative services and reducing the need for in-person visits. To enroll, users must register their identity online or in person, link a phone number, and confirm their physical ID. Notably, MiDNI does not locally store users’ full personal data, it fetches needed attributes from the DNI database in real time.

ref  ref1

• For now (as of early-2025), MiDNI can be used for in-person identity verification (face-to-face), e.g. checking into hotels, opening bank accounts, renting cars, verifying identity for services, picking up parcels, etc.

• MiDNI uses a secure temporary QR code, signed by the police, to represent identity attributes. 

• The app does not store personal data locally. Instead, it fetches needed identity data in real time from the DNI database when required. 

• To enroll, a person must link their phone number and confirm their physical ID (DNI).

MiDNI is developed by the National Police and the Royal Mint

Key stakeholders include:

• The Spanish government / Interior Ministry

• National Police (they sign the QR codes) 

• The Royal Mint (involved in development) 

• Public and private organizations that must adapt to accept the digital format within 12 months. 

• Citizens / users, who must register and confirm identity to use MiDNI.

• MiDNI is already launched and available via the official app. 

• The physical ID card remains valid for now. Organizations have 12 months to adapt. 

• Plans for 2026 include adding digital signatures and remote ID verification to enable more e-government and online services.

• Russia is launching a national digital identity “super-app” starting September 2025, which will come pre-installed on all smartphones and devices sold in Russia.
• Features:
  • Combines digital ID, messaging, e-signatures, payments, and access to government/private services.
  • Integrated with Gosuslugi (Russia’s main e-government portal).
  • Allows citizens to verify age, check into hotels, access benefits, and even replace physical passports for many everyday tasks.
• The app is modeled after China’s WeChat, raising concerns about surveillance and censorship.
  [biometricupdate.com], [identity-economy.de], [nationalse...urity.news]

• Russia’s approach is not equivalent to EUDI Wallet:
  • EUDI Wallet (EU) emphasizes privacy, user control, and interoperability.
  • Russia’s model is centralized, mandatory, and tied to state-controlled platforms.
• The Russian system focuses on digital sovereignty and state monitoring, not on cross-border interoperability or selective disclosure like EUDI.
  [biometricupdate.com]

• Russia uses:
  • ESIA (Unified System of Identification and Authentication) for e-government services.
  • Unified Biometrics System (UBS) for facial recognition and biometric verification.
• PID includes:
  • Passport details, biometric data (face, fingerprints), demographic info.
• These systems are increasingly integrated with Gosuslugi and will become mandatory for online age verification and other services, effectively ending online anonymity.
  [identityblitz.com], [reclaimthenet.org], [slaynews.com]

• Russia does not publish detailed architecture frameworks like EU’s ARF, but:
  • Presidential decrees (e.g., 2023 decree equating digital IDs with paper passports) and State Duma laws define the legal basis.
  • Technical details for ESIA and biometric systems are partially available through government portals and contractors (e.g., Rostelecom).
• Access is limited compared to EU standards; most documents are in Russian and not fully open for international review.
  [tvbrics.com], [tadviser.com]

• Government agencies:
  • Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media
  • Federal Security Service (FSB)
  • State Duma committees
• State-aligned tech companies:
  • VKontakte (VK) – main contender for the super-app
  • Rostelecom – operator of ESIA
• Financial institutions and telecom providers (for KYC/AML compliance).
• Citizens (mandatory adoption expected for most services).
  [biometricupdate.com], [interfax.com], [atlanticcouncil.org]

• Launch date: September 1, 2025 – mandatory pre-installation on all new devices.
• Integration:
  • Gosuslugi portal, ESIA, UBS, and payment systems.
• Legislation:
  • Laws passed in June 2025 mandate the app and biometric verification for online age checks.
• Trend:
  • Russia is moving toward full state-controlled identity ecosystem, eliminating anonymity online.
• Concerns:
  • Privacy risks, surveillance, and censorship.
• Digital Ruble:
  • Separate initiative for digital currency, with wallets linked to the Central Bank (pilot in 2026).
    [biometricupdate.com], [slaynews.com], [blog.mixer.money]

Canada does not yet have a single nationwide digital identity wallet, but several initiatives exist:

• • GC Sign-In & GC Issue and Verify: Federal platforms under development to allow Canadians to sign in once and access all government services, and to store digital versions of credentials (e.g., work permits, licenses) on mobile devices. [canada.ca]
  • Provincial wallets:
    • BC Wallet (live): Stores verifiable credentials for government and private services using privacy-preserving technology. [digitalide...yindex.com] British Columbia has developed the Canada's first government-issued digital identity solution, used to securely store and share digital credentials with public and private organizations in the region. ref
    • Ontario Digital ID (planned): A secure digital ID program for online and in-person use, delayed but still in development. [digitalide...yindex.com]
    • Alberta has introduced the Digital Alberta Wallet app, beginning with a mobile health card available to residents 14 and older. The app uses encryption and requires user consent for data sharing, ensuring privacy, while paper health cards remain valid. Parents can add children’s cards, and spouses can share within the wallet. More government documents will be added in the future, with a combined driver’s licence–health card expected by 2026." ref
• These wallets are optional and designed for selective disclosure (e.g., proving age without sharing full identity). [diacc.ca]
   

• Canada’s approach is similar in concept but not identical:
  • The Pan-Canadian Trust Framework (PCTF) provides interoperability and privacy principles for digital ID systems, akin to EUDI’s architecture. [diacc.ca]
  • Canada emphasizes federated identity (provincial and federal collaboration) rather than a single national wallet.
  • Unlike EUDI Wallet, Canada’s system is not mandated by law and remains voluntary.
• Canada’s Digital Ambition strategy aligns with global standards like eIDAS, but implementation is slower and fragmented. [biometricupdate.com]

• Canada does not have a centralized PID repository like China or India.
• PID includes:
  • Passport, driver’s license, health card, and other government-issued credentials.
  • Biometric authentication is supported but optional (e.g., facial recognition for wallet apps).
• The PCTF and CAN/DGSI 103-0:2025 standard define processes for identity proofing, credential issuance, and authentication, ensuring privacy and user control. [biometricupdate.com], [diacc.ca]

• Pan-Canadian Trust Framework (PCTF): Open resource for interoperability and privacy in digital identity systems. [diacc.ca]
• CAN/DGSI 103-0:2025: National standard for digital trust and identity, aligned with international frameworks (eIDAS, FATF). [biometricupdate.com]
• Government of Canada ICAM Framework: Defines identity, credential, and access management for federal services. [canada-ca.github.io]
• Canada’s Digital Ambition 2024–25: Strategic plan for digital government transformation.
  All these documents are publicly accessible online. [canada.ca]

• Federal agencies:
  • Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat
  • Canadian Digital Service (CDS)
• Standards bodies:
  • Digital ID & Authentication Council of Canada (DIACC)
  • Digital Governance Standards Institute (DGSI)
• Provincial governments: Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta (digital ID programs)
• Private sector: Banks, telecoms, tech companies (e.g., Interac, SecureKey)
• Civil society: Privacy advocates, research labs (Digital Identity Lab) [digitalide...yindex.com], [diacc.ca], [dtlab-labcn.org]

As of 2025:

• Standards: CAN/DGSI 103-0 approved as a national standard in August 2025. [biometricupdate.com]
• Provincial wallets: BC Wallet live; Ontario Digital ID still in planning.
• Federal initiatives: GC Sign-In and GC Issue and Verify platforms under development.
• Policy: Canada’s Digital Ambition updated for 2024–25; cybersecurity legislation (Bill C-8) introduced to protect critical infrastructure and align with identity frameworks. [diacc.ca], [canada.ca]
• Challenges:
  • Fragmentation between federal and provincial systems.
  • Privacy concerns and slow adoption compared to EU and Asia.
• Canada scores 81.5 (Very High) on the Global Digital Identity Index, reflecting strong capabilities but incomplete nationwide rollout. [digitalide...yindex.com]

Costa Rica has launched a national mobile digital ID app, introducing Identidad Digital Costarricense (IDC) as a secure digital alternative to physical ID cards. The initiative underscores government modernization, biometric verification, and international standards. Key updates include support for facial biometrics, collaboration with KOMSCO on blockchain-based architecture, mandatory digital acceptance by public authorities and major service providers, a four-year validity period, and phased implementation—excluding its use in the next national election.

China launched a national digital identity system called Cyberspace ID in July 2025.

• It provides each user with:
  • A unique internet ID number (letters and numbers).
  • A digital certificate linked to their real identity but without exposing explicit personal details online.
• Enrollment requires submission of national ID card, biometric data (facial recognition), and sometimes passport details via a government mobile app.
• Initially voluntary, but expected to become mandatory for all online platforms over time.
  [mobileidworld.com], [quasa.io]

Not exactly.

• China’s approach is centralized and state-controlled, unlike the EU’s EUDI Wallet, which emphasizes user control, interoperability, and privacy.
• The Chinese system is not a self-sovereign wallet; it is a government-issued credential integrated with surveillance and regulatory frameworks.
• While EUDI Wallet focuses on cross-border interoperability and selective disclosure, China’s system aims at domestic governance, security, and social control.
  [docs.fairway.global], [mobileidworld.com]

• China’s framework uses internet ID numbers and network credentials as tokens for online identity.
• These correspond to real-world identity verified through official documents (resident ID, passport, Hong Kong/Macau/Taiwan travel permits).
• PID includes biometric data, national ID numbers, and other sensitive information stored in a centralized government database.
• The system aims to reduce data collection by private platforms but consolidates control under state authorities.
  [loc.gov], [mobileidworld.com]

• Measures on the Management of the National Internet Identity Authentication Public Service (finalized May 2025) define the architecture for Cyberspace ID.
• Drafts were published for public comment in 2024 on official government portals.
• Additionally, Guidelines for National Data Infrastructure Construction (2024) outline broader plans for integrated data markets and identity schemes.
• Some documents are translated and accessible via sources like China Law Translate and research centers (e.g., Georgetown CSET).
  [loc.gov], [cset.georgetown.edu]

• Government agencies:
  • Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)
  • Ministry of Public Security (MPS)
  • National Health Commission
  • Ministry of Civil Affairs
  • State Administration for Radio and Television
• Tech companies:
  • Major platforms like Taobao, Xiaohongshu, WeChat integrated with the system.
• Citizens (mandatory adoption expected).
• Private sector (banks, e-commerce, healthcare) for compliance and integration.
  [digitalidentityindex.com], [business-standard.com]

• Launch date: July 15, 2025.
• Adoption: Over 6 million users registered by mid-2025; 16 million app downloads reported during trials.
• Integrated with major platforms and expected to become mandatory for all online services.
• Concerns:
  • Privacy risks due to centralized biometric and identity data.
  • Potential for behavioral monitoring and censorship.
• Government frames it as improving security, fraud prevention, and convenience, but critics see it as deepening surveillance.
  [mobileidworld.com], [quasa.io]